Representatives of Libya’s rival political camps recently signed a landmark agreement in Tripoli, drafting a roadmap that could see presidential and legislative elections within 24 months.

Mediated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the “4+4 committee” agreement attempts to resolve recurring legal and institutional disputes that have crippled the nation since 2011.

However, in a country plagued by deep mistrust, shifting alliances, and entrenched armed factions, the path from a signed document to a unified government remains fraught with challenges.

Decades of division

Libya has been in a near-perpetual state of instability since a 2011 uprising toppled and killed longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi.

Initially, the country showed political promise, but divisions slowly arose in the rebel camp, chiefly between factions controlling the east and west.

In August 2012, the National Transitional Council officially handed over power to the newly elected General National Congress in what remains the country’s first and only peaceful transfer of power following national elections.

That fragile democratic momentum, however, quickly disintegrated into armed conflict. In May 2014, renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar took control of Benghazi and still controls the east of Libya.

A divisive election later that year prompted some newly announced MPs to form the House of Representatives and relocate to the eastern city of Tobruk under Haftar’s military protection.

The political divide turned into open warfare in April 2019 when Haftar launched an unsuccessful 14-month offensive to capture the capital Tripoli, where the United Nations-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) was based.

By June 2020, the front lines stabilised near the strategic central city of Sirte, leading to a formal ceasefire agreement later that year that froze military hostilities but left the underlying political fracture intact.

Rivals and rulers

This left Libya with two distinct authorities operating across its territory.

Tripoli is home to the internationally recognised GNA, headed by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. This western-based authority includes the High Council of State – an advisory legislative body currently led by Mohammed Takala – and the Presidential Council, chaired by Mohammad al-Manfi.

In Tobruk and Benghazi, political power centres on the House of Representatives, led by Speaker Aguila Saleh, which supports a parallel eastern administration. But primary control across eastern and southern Libya is exercised by the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by Khalifa Haftar.

In recent years, Haftar’s son and LNA deputy commander, Saddam Haftar, has assumed a critical role within the eastern establishment, emerging as the heir apparent, a key military commander, and a central political negotiator.

Profiting from chaos

Despite the 2020 ceasefire, political reunification has remained elusive due to failed international initiatives and systemic economic competition. The 2015 UN-brokered Skhirat Agreement created the GNA.

But it also preserved rival legislative bodies, meaning institutional duplication and the country remaining divided between two powers.

A subsequent UN political track appointed Dbeibah to lead an interim executive in 2021, contingent on conducting national elections at the end of the year.

As part of this deal, Dbeibah agreed not to run, but the 2021 election collapsed just two days before the scheduled vote when he reneged on his pledge.

Global diplomatic push

Another key factor in this new agreement is the involvement of major powers. Under United States President Donald Trump, Washington has intensified efforts to broker a unification deal, led by White House adviser Massad Boulos and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Boulos has put forward an initiative offering US energy investments in Libya’s oil fields in exchange for a unified executive. Washington even proposed a power-sharing arrangement that could see Dbeibah remain as prime minister while Saddam Haftar served as president.

This diplomatic push coincides with an extensive international tour by Saddam Haftar, who has held high-level meetings across regional and Western capitals.

Haftar has held talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and engaged in direct diplomacy with key Arab leaders. Haftar also met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington to discuss institution unification.

Furthermore, regional dynamics have shifted as Turkiye has expanded military and technical cooperation with Saddam Haftar and eastern authorities.

Joint military drills between eastern and western forces in Sirte under US supervision further illustrate this evolving landscape.

A historic breakthrough?

The newly signed 4+4 agreement ultimately represents a deliberate attempt to balance power between east and west, analysts say.

The makeup of the committee in its eight members reflects this: Two are from the House of Representatives, two from the High Council of State, and two each from Dbeibah’s government and Haftar’s eastern command.

The agreement mandates presidential and parliamentary elections within 24 months under a single executive authority.

It also seems aimed at resolving the primary legal disputes that destroyed the 2021 vote by allowing dual citizens to contest the presidency – so long as the winner relinquishes foreign nationality before taking the oath of office.

Further, it permits military officers to run as candidates upon stepping down from official posts. Both of these legal changes would appear designed to pave the way for either Saddam or Khalifa Haftar, who are believed to have US nationalities and are commanders in the self-styled LNA, to have official government posts.

The deal also restructures the High National Elections Commission under new leadership and establishes rotating official sessions in Tripoli in the west, Benghazi in the east, and Sabha in the south.

Analyst Wissam Abdul Kabir argued that the direct involvement of armed factions distinguishes this pact from previous ones.

“I believe what makes it different is that for the first time, the agreement is signed between the active parties,” Abdul Kabir told Al Jazeera.

“In previous agreements, whether in Geneva in 2021 or the Skhirat agreement in 2015, the agreement was made between the two councils or between the legitimate or elected bodies whose ballot-box legitimacy has eroded over time.

“Therefore, the difference is that the agreement is approved, adopted, and signed by the active parties on the ground, and this is a fundamental point.”

Still, many in Libya view 4+4 as the latest in a series of failed peace initiatives.

High Council of State leader Mohammed Takala boycotted the ceremony, while Presidential Council head Mohammad al-Manfi openly criticised the procedural transparency and foreign involvement in the arrangement.

Mohammed Mahfouz, a political analyst, said the arrangement appears to be nothing more than an attempt by outside powers to cement the powers of Saddam Haftar and Dbeibah.

“The matter goes beyond being confined to the issue of candidacy conditions only. The most important framework is that we are facing a repeated scenario tried in 2015 in the Skhirat Agreement in Morocco, and after that in Tunis and Geneva in 2021,” Mahfouz told Al Jazeera.

“Back then, it was always said that these political agreements take place between active parties … but Libyans did not go to elections.”

Despite the promise of new elections, there is little hope that Libya’s current leaders will relinquish their power if they lose at the ballot box.

“Is it possible to believe the hypothesis that parties possessing power and money, and possessing today new legitimacy according to this agreement and greater authority, will simply accept to be removed from power after two years and lead us towards elections?” said Mahfouz.

“There is a firm conviction among everyone that whoever reaches power in Libya cannot budge an inch from it except by the rifle, unfortunately.”