Sudan’s war has entered its fourth year, but there is little indication the conflict will end any time soon, as the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are locked in battle for control of the North African nation.
Life has gradually returned to a fragile state of near-normalcy in the capital, Khartoum, and central regions after the army regained control of the regions. However, this relative stability has been accompanied by a sense of unsettling uncertainty, as economic and living conditions continue to deteriorate, the military deadlock persists in the Kordofan region, and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur has worsened.
Recommended Stories
list of 4 itemsend of list
On the ground, the conflict has created a clear division between eastern and western Sudan, with the Sudanese army controlling the northern, central and eastern states, as well as the capital. Meanwhile, the RSF controls Darfur and large parts of the three Kordofan states, and has also opened a new front in the Blue Nile region along the border with Ethiopia.
On May 20 of last year, the Sudanese army recaptured Khartoum State from the RSF forces after more than two years of fighting, marking one of the biggest military developments of the year.
Earlier, on January 11, 2025, the army also retook Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira State. It then expanded its advances by pushing RSF forces out of northern White Nile State, breaking the siege on el-Obeid in North Kordofan in February 2025, and regaining Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan by last February. The army retook Bara, the second-largest city in North Kordofan, in March.
What gains have the RSF made?
Despite the army’s achievements, the RSF made significant military progress as well. Most notable is their capture of el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, on October 26 of last year after a two-year siege. This allowed it to consolidate control over most of the region, except for three northern regions still held by the army and joint forces, as well as areas controlled by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) armed group led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur.
Emboldened by the fall of el-Fasher, the RSF advanced towards Babnusa in West Kordofan later in December 2025. This came shortly before the army withdrew from the Heglig oil region, the country’s largest oilfield in West Kordofan, resulting in the state in effect falling under RSF control.
RSF forces remain present in scattered areas of North Kordofan, including Umm Qarfah, Jabra al-Sheikh, Umm Badr, Hamra al-Sheikh, and Sodari. They are also active in parts of South Kordofan, particularly in Al Quoz, Al-Hamadi and Al Dibibat.
By the end of the third year, the conflict had spread to eastern Sudan. And with the joint force of the RSF and SPLM-North, the city of Kurmuk in Blue Nile State was captured in March of last year. This prompted the Sudanese government to accuse Ethiopia of providing military and logistical support – an accusation they have since denied.
The nature of the war has also evolved in recent months. The RSF has increasingly been relying on drones to strike targets in central and northern Sudan. In response, the army has acquired new drones, enabling it to target supply lines, eliminate several RSF leaders and destroy their military equipment.
The human cost of the war
On the humanitarian front, the war has reached catastrophic levels. A joint report by the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and Intersos found that about 14 million people have been displaced over three years. Simultaneously, 26 million people face acute food insecurity, while 33.7 million require humanitarian assistance, including 7.4 million people internally displaced.
The Norwegian Refugee Council reports that most families have been forced to reduce their daily meals due to worsening economic conditions and loss of income.
In Khartoum, prices of fuel, bread, goods and services have risen sharply in recent days. This has coincided with the depreciation of the Sudanese pound, with the US dollar now worth about 600 pounds.
Despite some improvements in security in certain areas, the International Organization for Migration reports that about 3.99 million people had returned to their homes as of April, mainly to Khartoum and Gezira.
Of these, 83 percent are internally displaced people and 17 percent returned from abroad. More than 13 million people remain displaced or refugees, including about nine million within the country.
In Khartoum
The appointment of Kamil El-Tayeb Idris as prime minister in May 2025 was a major development politically, as was the formation of a civilian government.
This marked the first such step since Abdalla Hamdok’s resignation in January 2022, following the collapse of political consensus after Army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan dissolved the transitional government in 2021. The 2021 coup disrupted the democratic transition process established after the fall of long-term leader Omar al-Bashir in 2019 following a mass uprising.
In January of this year, the government officially returned to Khartoum after operating from Port Sudan as a temporary capital since August 2023. The war erupted on April 15, 2023, over a power struggle between the army and the RSF.
Despite this, international and regional efforts to end the war have only stalled.
The Quadrilateral Initiative – the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates – has failed to achieve a breakthrough despite presenting a peace plan in September. Similarly, the Sudanese government’s proposal in February 2025, later presented again to the United Nations Security Council in December, did not yield tangible progress.
Possible scenarios
Military researcher Mohamed al-Amin al-Tayeb has described the third year of war as a state of stagnation, with neither side achieving a decisive victory. Weapons continue to flow to the RSF through neighbouring countries, while the group increasingly relies on mercenaries, particularly from South Sudan – amid difficulties in recruiting new fighters.
Al-Tayeb has outlined several possible scenarios for the fourth year. The most notable is the continuation of the military impasse, one that continues to debilitate the country, leaving it in a state of uncertainty, with the balance slightly favouring the army.
Another possibility is the deepening of administrative and political division between eastern and western Sudan, especially as the RSF attempts to establish parallel governance structures. Last July, a Sudanese coalition led by the RSF announced the establishment of an alternative government in a challenge to the military-led authorities in Khartoum.
Al-Tayeb also warned of an intensifying proxy war, with regional powers competing within Sudan by backing rival sides, potentially reshaping the broader regional order. However, growing international and regional pressure may push both sides towards negotiations, in an effort to prevent the conflict from spilling into neighbouring countries and triggering wider humanitarian and security crises.
The Middle East is already reeling from the US-Israeli war on Iran. Currently, diplomatic efforts are under way to end the war that has caused a global energy crisis and riles the markets.
About the Author
