Sanaa, Yemen – The past few days have seen a mobilisation of Yemen’s Houthi forces in areas under their control with a full resumption of all-out war a real possibility after four years of quasi-peace.

On Wednesday, the Houthis claimed responsibility for missile and drone attacks on two Saudi ships in the Red Sea, which the rebels said had defied their blockade on the kingdom’s ports.

Simultaneously, clashes between Houthi fighters and Yemeni government-affiliated forces erupted on a front line in the southwestern governorate of Dhale, causing more than 30 casualties on both sides.

With these two recent developments, the Houthis have moved from rhetoric and mobilisation to military action. After years of battlefield gains, the Houthis are now seeking to pursue military domination on the ground against their opponents, notably forces loyal to the internationally recognised Yemeni government.

The Houthis are self-assured. They have been able to withstand attacks from the government, a Saudi-led coalition, the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel over the past decade and still continue to hold Yemen’s populous northwest, including the capital, Sanaa.

But such confidence may be misplaced as several factors have been changing over the past four years – including the increased consolidation of anti-Houthi forces under the leadership of the government. 

While experts said the Houthis remain powerful actors in Yemen with considerable military force and influence at their disposal, the strategic environment has undeniably changed. This would make a resumption of war more difficult for the Houthis due to a plethora of factors.

More coordination, less division

In September 2014, the Houthis captured Sanaa and, amid weak military resistance and deep divides, pushed deeper into other parts of Yemen.

The Houthis’ dramatic rise to power left the government divided and fragile, and due to the impending threat from the rebels, many political leaders, including then-President Abd-Rabu Mansour Hadi, fled Yemen for safety abroad, notably to Saudi Arabia.

In March 2015, an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia joined the war in support of the Yemeni government and remained directly involved until an April 2022 truce.

Yet several years of war did not weaken the Houthis’ resolve or reverse their territorial gains. The conflicting agenda of the Arab coalition members, specifically the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, coupled with infighting within the Yemeni government camp, enabled the Houthis to maintain an upper hand over their opponents.

Late last year, the Yemeni government ordered the UAE’s expulsion from Yemen while Saudi Arabia has provided military support to subdue Abu Dhabi’s ally in the south, the separatist Southern Transitional Council. All of this has put the government in a better position than at other points in the war.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that greater cohesion within the Yemeni government camp could turn the momentum of the war away from the Houthis.

“We are already starting to see some of these dynamics. Compared with earlier this year, the Presidential Leadership Council [Yemen’s UN-recognised authority] is less divided, and decision-making appears more coordinated,” Nagi said.

“Saudi Arabia has also become the main regional actor on the ground, working more closely with the different anti-Houthi factions,” he added. “That puts the Yemeni government in a better position than before and could make things more difficult for the Houthis.”

“But the outcome will depend on how that conflict is managed. If the Yemeni government approaches a military campaign against the Houthis differently, with better coordination and a unified strategy, it could put real pressure on the Houthis and shift the balance of power on the ground,” Nagi said.

Marwan Ali Noman, a senior fellow at the Washington Center for Yemeni Studies told Al Jazeera the emergence of an anti-Houthi tribal alliance in al-Jawf in northern Yemen east of Sanaa could be a major concern for the rebels. The unity of military forces behind the government and growing international concern over Red Sea security – particularly after Houthi threats to shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb strait – have all strengthened the position of anti-Houthi forces, he said.

“[These developments] could improve [anti-Houthi forces’] ability to achieve territorial gains should the recent escalation develop into any kind of confrontation,” Noman told Al Jazeera.

The Houthis continue to have strong military capabilities, particularly when it comes to missiles and drones, but after the withdrawal of the UAE from Yemen, government forces have achieved more political unity, coordinated military planning and external support, he added.

A new regional alliance

The Houthis have launched attacks on shipping in the Red Sea before, notably on US- and Israel-linked ships from 2023 to 2025. They did so in solidarity with the Palestinian people after the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

In retaliation, Israel, the US and the UK launched hundreds of air strikes on what they said were Houthi sites in Yemen. In May 2025, the Houthis halted their attacks on shipping after reaching an agreement with the US.

Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, told Al Jazeera that if the latest Houthi threats turn into a sustained campaign against Saudi-linked commercial vessels, the response could be quite different this time.

“It may accelerate the formation of new regional alliances to protect maritime traffic, particularly as advanced discussions are already taking place among several regional states with support from other international partners,” al-Jeddawy said. “It could also involve greater support for local ground forces, which have used the period of relative calm since 2022 to rebuild, rearm and strengthen their positions.”

US President Donald Trump warned there would be a “major military punishment” for both Iran and the Houthis after the Yemeni group struck two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea on Wednesday.

“If they do this again, the U.S. will hold Iran responsible, in that the Houthis are a Surrogate and/or Proxy of Iran,” Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social platform.

For their part, the Houthis are betting that Saudi Arabia and other regional states will not be willing to withstand attacks on their territory and will instead seek to quickly reach a deal rather than continue fighting.

Unprecedented challenge

Hamad al-Hazmi, a tribal leader from al-Jawf province, was detained in Sanaa for 50 days after a dispute with Houthi figures. When he was released in late June, he returned to his tribe in al-Jawf and publicly spoke about what he described as the injustice he was subjected to during his detention.

In response, thousands of tribesmen from different provinces gathered in al-Jawf this month and publicly condemned the Houthi authorities.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni author focusing on political and military issues in Yemen, said tribal opposition to the Houthis marks a major development in the war.

“In my opinion, for the first time, the tribes are rising in this form of unity despite the fragmentation and attrition they have suffered over the past years of war,” Mussed told Al Jazeera.

The anti-Houthi tribal alliance in al-Jawf, Mussed added, could offer critical support for government military operations if fighting were to re-erupt.

However, al-Jeddawy said, this would depend on how broad and cohesive this tribal alliance proves to be and whether it can coordinate effectively with government forces.

“The Houthis have not faced this kind of challenge since the early years of the war when they could still draw on military units and commanders loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh” from 2014 to 2017, al-Jeddawy said.

Houthi-affiliated army units are made up of more than 200,000 fighters, according to official records in Sanaa, while the group could potentially call tens of thousands more loyalists to arms in areas under its control.

While recent months have seen major developments in favour of the government, al-Jeddawy argued that there has still not been a decisive shift in the balance of power in Yemen. That would depend on Yemeni government and anti-Houthi forces unifying their decision-making, coordinating across several fronts and securing sustained regional support.

“The Houthis retain important advantages: unified command and control, and missiles, fortified positions and extensive combat experience,” he said.

“[Anti-Houthi forces] are in a stronger position than they were at the start of the 2022 truce, but translating that improvement into a strategic shift remains far from guaranteed.”